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I. INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide use of mobile-cellular1 technology has become 
ubiquitous over the past decade in all demographic groups, especially 
young children.  The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) 
confirms the rapid expansion of cellular technology, reporting an 
increase in global cellular subscriptions from 15.5% of the population in 
2001 to 96.2% in 2011.2  In a recent release, the ITU reported a 
staggering 6.8 billion total cellular subscribers—a number fast 
approaching the total global population of 7.1 billion.3  In the United 
States alone, the number reaches more than 303 million.4 
Accompanying this exponential growth in the use of mobile 
technology are mounting concerns about the possible adverse physical 
and medical effects of these devices, which expose users to 
radiofrequency (“RF”) radiation.5  Wireless handheld telephones send 
and receive electromagnetic energy, which is transmitted between the 
cell phone antenna and base stations6 in the area from which the phone is 
used to make or receive calls.7  The energy is not directional—that is, the 
                                                                                                             
 1 I use the terms “mobile” and “cellular” interchangeably, to refer to all kinds of 
wireless hand held telephones, commonly known as “cell phones.” 
 2 Global ICT Developments, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, 
available for download at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx 
(last visited June 25, 2013). 
 3 ICT Facts and Figures, ITU TELECOMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT BUREAU  (Feb. 
2013), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/material/ICTFactsFigures2013.pdf. 
 4 Nicholas P. Panayotopoulos et al., Litigation Alert: Cell Phones as Carcinogens, 
DRI TODAY (May 17, 2012), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=338. 
 5 Seung-Kwon Myung et al., Mobile Phone Use and Risk of Tumors: A Meta-
Analysis, 27 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5565, 5566 (2009), available at 
http://jco.ascopubs.org/cgi/doi/10.1200/JCO.2008.21.6366. 
 6 As explained in greater detail below, base stations are fixed structures that transmit 
wireless signals along a network of towers. See infra pp. 6–7. 
 7 FAQs – Wireless Phones, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, http:// 
www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/faqs-wireless-phones (last visited Aug. 31, 2013). 
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signal is transmitted outwardly in all directions from the antenna.8  When 
a person makes a call from a cell phone, the device converts the sound of 
the caller’s voice into radiofrequency energy, or radio waves.9  Those RF 
transmissions travel through the air until they reach a receiver at a nearby 
base station or cell site, which then forwards the signal through the 
wireless network of cell towers until it reaches a base station near the 
person receiving the call.10  That base station then sends out RF waves 
that are detected by the receiving cell phone’s built-in antenna, and “the 
signals are changed back into the sound of a voice.”11 
At certain levels, the energy generated by these RF emissions can 
be harmful to humans.12  It is well established that, at high levels of 
exposure, RF radiation can cause biological damage by heating human 
tissue.13  Scientific studies have also found non-thermal biological effects 
at relatively low levels of exposure, including changes in the immune 
system, neurological effects, behavioral changes, alterations in brain 
tissue and breaks in strands of deoxyribonucleic acid—that is, our 
DNA.14  According to past comments by the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”), which regulates these devices, “whether or not 
such effects might indicate a human health hazard is not presently 
known.”15 
Several prominent scientists compare the cell phone threat to the 
harm caused by tobacco and asbestos, which was discovered only after 
decades of use caused irremediable lung damage and untreatable cancers 
                                                                                                             
 8 Cellular Phones, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
http://www.dm.usda.gov/ocpm/Security%20Guide/V2comint/Cellular.htm (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2013). 
 9 FAQs, supra note 7. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Robert F. Cleveland, Jr. & Jerry L. Ulcek, Questions and Answers about 
Biological Effects and Potential Hazards of Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, 
FCC OET Bulletin 56, 6 (4th ed. 1999), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus
/Engineering_Technology/Documents/bulletins/oet56/oet56e4.pdf; U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-545, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: 
TELECOMUNICATIONS—RESEARCH AND REGULATORY EFFORTS ON MOBILE PHONE HEALTH 
ISSUES, at 7, 20 (2001), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d01545.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO Report]. 
 13 See Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12, at 6. 
 14 Id. at 8. 
 15 Id.; see also, e.g., Bruce Stutz, Are Cell Phones Safe? The Verdict Is Still Out, 
YALE ENV’T 360, Aug. 2, 2010, http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2300; 
Cecilia Kang, Cellphone Cancer Study Inconclusive; Researcher Urges More Study, 
WASH. POST, (May 16, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/05/
cell_phone_cancer_study_produc.html. 
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in thousands of people.16  This view is consistent with recent studies 
warning of the dangers of cell phone use and the biological effects of RF 
radiation emissions. But the results of these studies are varied and no 
concrete scientific consensus has been achieved.  While some studies 
suggest that no significant adverse health effects are associated with RF 
emissions, others posit “an increased risk for glioma, a malignant form of 
brain cancer,” and other maladies from cell phone use.17  The recent 
classification by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”) of RF emissions 
as “possibly carcinogenic to humans”18 has upped the ante significantly 
for plaintiff lawyers, state legislators, city officials and others who see a 
possible connection between cell phone use and harmful health effects, 
and suggests that mobile phone users may be exposed to serious health 
risks about which they are unaware.19 
Although the evidence is not conclusive, many physicians and 
public health researchers have warned that cell phones may increase the 
risk of brain cancer and other conditions.  The concern is particularly 
acute for children, whose developing brains are more susceptible to RF 
radiation exposure.20  Nonetheless, and despite the serious health 
concerns and uncertain degree of risk, the cell phone industry has 
consistently advertised and marketed their cell phones as totally “safe.”21 
Any credible scientific study conclusively linking cell phone use to 
health risks could fuel litigation with far-reaching implications.  
However, controversy over whether federal preemption of litigation 
                                                                                                             
 16 See, e.g., Vini G. Khurana et al., There Is Currently Enough Evidence and 
Technology Available to Warrant Taking Immediate Steps to Reduce Exposure of 
Consumers to Cell-Phone-Related Electromagnetic Radiation, 35 MED. PHYSICS 5203, 
5203 (2008); Council of Europe, The Potential Dangers of Electromagnetic Fields and 
Their Effect on the Environment, at 1, Doc. 12608 (May 6, 2011), http://
www.saferphonezone.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Council_Europe_Report_
The_potential_dangers_of_electromagnetic_fields_and_their_effect_on_the_environment
_06_05_20116.pdf; Tumors and Cell Phone Use: What the Science Says: Hearing Before 
the H. Domestic Policy S. Comm Oversight and Gov. Reform Comm.,110th Cong. 8 
(2008) (statement of Ronald B. Herberman, M.D), available at http://
cellphones.procon.org/sourcefiles/Herberman_Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Herberman]. 
 17 See, e.g., Press Release, World Health Organization IARC, IARC Classifies 
Electromagnetic Fields as Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans (May 31, 2011), 
www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2011/pdfs/pr208_E.pdf [hereinafter WHO Press 
Release]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Paul Scott, Is Your Life on the Line, MEN’S HEALTH (April 10, 2010), 
http://www.menshealth.com/health/cellphone-risks-and-radiation 
 21 See infra Part IV. 
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involving cell phone emissions makes such lawsuits “dead on arrival” 
has resulted in conflicting decisions—and therefore unpredictable 
outcomes. At least one federal Circuit Court has held that federal law 
preempts state law in consumer litigation over cell phone emissions,22 
while an adjacent Court of Appeals has held just the opposite.23 In 
between are state court decisions finding only partial preemption of 
consumer remedies and preservation of others.24 
This article first addresses the technology of cell phone 
communications—that is, how those transmissions work.  Part II 
explores medical and other scientific studies that have found a causal 
link between exposure to RF emissions and biological injury, or that 
have exonerated those devices from any such causal connection with the 
data then available.25  Part III discusses the wireless industry’s response 
to these studies.  Part IV then traces the regulatory history of RF 
emissions by the FCC, the agency that has primary regulatory authority 
over these devices.  In Part V, the article discusses the conflicting 
decisions of two federal Circuit Courts of Appeals over whether federal 
law preempts state law claims based on exposure to RF emissions.  
Finally, Part VI concludes by reflecting on the far-reaching, and likely 
unintended, consequences of decisions that have found broad federal 
preemption of state consumer law claims. 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY 
A. Cell Sites 
The rapid increase in cell phone use has been accompanied by the 
equally rapid construction of cell sites—structures that house the 
                                                                                                             
 22 See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 133-34 (3rd Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 365 (2011). 
 23 See, e.g., Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 998 
(2005). 
 24 See, e.g., Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009). 
 25 Much of the survey of the medical and health studies is drawn largely from the 
thorough and excellent research conducted in Kartikeya Makker, Cell Phones: Modern 
Man’s Nemesis? 18 REPROD. MED. ONLINE 1 (2009) and Carol R. Goforth, A Bad Call: 
Preemption of State and Local Authority to Regulate Wireless Communication Facilities 
on the Basis of Radiofrequency Emissions, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 311, 345–346 (2001).  
Readers are referred to those authorities for a more detailed discussion of the medical and 
scientific literature. That and similar research is set forth in some detail in this article only 
for purposes of giving context to and aiding in understanding the discussion of the FCC’s 
regulatory activity and litigation which follows, not to persuade the reader on the 
“science” involved in the health debate surrounding cell phones, which is ongoing. 
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necessary electronic transmission equipment along with the towers on 
which those antennae are mounted.  The FCC authorizes and regulates 
those towers to support the transfer of signals between cellular devices, 
creating a network of cellular access.26  For each cell site, the level of 
permissible RF transmission depends on the number of radio channels 
(“transmitters”) that have been authorized, and the accompanying power 
of each.27  FCC regulations permit an effective radiated power (“ERP”) 
of up to 500 watts (“W”) per channel, though a majority of urban and 
suburban cell sites operate at an ERP of no more than 100 W per 
channel.28 
The signal emitted from cell towers is transmitted in a wave, toward 
the horizon, which renders ground-level exposure to these emissions 
relatively insignificant.29  Like any transmitter of RF energy, the 
intensity, measured as “power density,” of emissions also decreases 
sharply as one moves away from the antenna.30  As a result, societal 
health risks associated with RF emissions from cell towers are reportedly 
minimal—the greatest risk is posed to individuals who work on these 
sites.31  According to FCC calculations of a “worst-case” scenario of 
health risks associated with cell towers, an individual would “essentially 
have to remain in the main transmitting beam [at the height of the 
antenna] and within a few feet of the antenna” to experience RF exposure 
that approaches FCC limits.32 
B. Dosimetry of RF Emissions and Thermal Heating 
“Radiation dosimetry” is a subfield of radiation exposure that 
measures the radiation doses in tissue resulting from  direct and indirect 
radiation, like those emitted by RF waves.33  RF radiation at high enough 
levels causes thermal heating of human tissue, which poses serious risks 
to human health.34  For example, RF radiation emitted from a microwave 
                                                                                                             
 26 Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12, at 20–21. 
 27 See id.  A typical cellular base station employs a maximum of 21 channels for each 
antenna, providing an average of 63 transmitting channels per site.  Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 20–21. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12,.at 21–22. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See GEORGE CARLO & MARTIN SCHRAM, CELL PHONES: INVISIBLE HAZARDS IN THE 
WIRELESS AGE 21 (2002); IARC, Non-Ionizing Radiation, Part 2: Radiofrequency 
Electromagnetic Fields, 102 IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC 
RISKS TO HUMANS 1, 68 (2013), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Monographs/vol102/mono102.pdf [hereinafter IARC, MONOGRAPHS]. 
 34 See, e.g., Panayotopoulos et. al., supra note 4. 
2013] A Tale of Two Circuits 7 
 
oven operating at 100 W or more propels RF waves at 2,450 megahertz 
(“MHz”)—powerful enough to thermally heat biological tissue.35  But 
microwave ovens are considered safe by scientists and health experts 
because FDA regulations require that these appliances be housed in 
material strong enough to prevent leakage outside of the device.36  
Cellular devices in the United States operate largely on 850 and 1900 
MHz bands, whereas most other countries operate on 900 and 1800 MHz 
frequencies—ranges still squarely in the middle of “microwave” 
territory.37 
Thermal heating of biological tissue also causes alterations in 
cellular physiology, which impairs basic cellular processes, including 
supplying nutrients to cells and cellular control functions.38  The 
breakdown of these cellular functions exposes the body to many adverse 
biological effects, including genetic mutations and damage to the 
immune system.39  When tissue is heated significantly, the consequences 
can be grave: cells die.40  This level of severe damage to biological tissue 
can impair the function of entire organs, such as the kidneys and liver.41 
Thermal heating of biological tissue also leads to breakdown and 
deterioration of DNA.42 Because mammals have sophisticated systems 
that repair DNA, this breakage does not inevitably lead to health 
complications.43   If the rate of DNA breakage, however, “is greater than 
the ability of the body to repair the broken DNA, serious mutations and 
chromosomal anomalies can occur,” potentially leading to immune 
system deficiencies, birth defects and cancer.44 
RF radiation emission is regulated by measuring the specific 
absorption rate (“SAR”), an expression of the amount of energy that 
passes through and thus may be absorbed by a local area of human 
tissue.45  SAR is expressed as the energy flow per unit of mass,46 and 
may also be measured by the average amount of RF radiation emission 
absorbed by the human body as a whole.47 
                                                                                                             
 35 CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 19. 
 36 Id. at 20. 
 37 Makker, supra note 25, at 149. 
 38 GAO Report, supra note 12, at 7; CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 19. 
 39 CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 19. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 19–20. 
 43 Id. at 20. 
 44 Id. 
 45 CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 20. 
 46 For example, watts per kilogram or W/kg. 
 47 Makker, supra note 25, at 149. 
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As of 1993, experts have not confirmed any harm associated with 
thermal effects of RF emissions at SAR levels below 40 W/kg.48  The 
FCC has regulated RF emissions in cell phones by capping allowable 
SAR levels at 1.6 W/kg.49  Mobile phones in the United States operate at 
a SAR ranging from .12 to 1.6 W/kg,50 so the cellular industry and 
federal government therefore conclude that cell phones are “safe” 
because this SAR cap of 1.6 W/kg is considerably less than the threshold 
for thermal effects (40 W/kg).51  This rationale, however, fails to take 
into account research studies suggesting that even at the comparatively 
low RF levels, there may be adverse non-thermal health effects caused 
by RF emissions from cell phones.52 
 
III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
The WHO classifies agents according to monographs published by 
the IARC, called IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic 
Risks to Humans.53  Established in 1965 and based in Lyon, France, the 
IARC is the cancer-research arm of the WHO that works to identify the 
causes of human cancer.54 
Potential cancer-causing agents reviewed by WHO are selected by 
ad hoc IARC advisory groups based on two primary criteria: (1) where 
there is evidence of human exposure and (2) where there is some 
evidence or suspicion of carcinogenicity.55  When an agent has been 
                                                                                                             
 48 CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 21. 
 49 Specific Absorption Rate (SAR) for Cellular Phones, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/specific-absorption-rate-sar-cellular-
telephones (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) [hereinafter SAR for Cellular Phones]. 
 50 Makker, supra note 25, at 211. 
 51 SAR for Cellular Phones, supra note 47; FAQs, supra note 7. 
 52 See Goforth, supra note 25, at 345–46 (citing C.K. Chou et al., Long-Term, Low-
Level Microwave Irradiation of Rats, 13 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 469 (1992)).  The GAO, 
the federal watchdog agency, has questioned the use of an exposure limit based solely on 
the thermal effects of RF emissions that “is not designed to address the possibility of any 
non-heating related effects, such as cancer.” GAO Report, supra note 12, at 20–21.  The 
GAO further questioned the reliability of testing procedures for RF emissions from cell 
phones, observing that test results “can vary substantially” because of human error, 
variations in the calibration of equipment, the “lack of standardized testing procedures” 
and other “important sources of variability.”  Id. at 18, 23–25. 
 53 See, e.g., IARC, Agents Classified by the IARC Monographs, Volumes 1–108, 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER (July 16, 2013), http://
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/index.php [hereinafter IARC, Agents Classified]. 
 54 Introduction to IARM Monographs Volume 102, INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR 
RESEARCH ON CANCER, at 1 (May 24–31, 2011), http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-
centre/iarcnews/2011/Intr_Monog102.pdf, 
 55 Id. at 2. 
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identified for further evaluation, the IARC surveys the openly available 
scientific literature relevant to an assessment of the agent’s 
carcinogenicity.56  The IARC then separately evaluates evidence of the 
agent related to incidents of cancer in humans and in experimental 
animals, designating the evidence as “sufficient,” “limited,” “inadequate” 
or “evidence suggesting lack of carcinogenicity” for both of these 
groups.57 The body of medical and scientific evidence is considered as a 
whole, to reach an overall evaluation of the carcinogenicity of the agent 
to humans.  A table of the carcinogenic agent classifications used by 
IARC is set forth below:58 
 
Group Carcinogenicity Total Agents 
Classified 
1 Carcinogenic to humans 111 
2A Probably carcinogenic to 
humans 
66 
2B Possibly carcinogenic to 
humans 
285 
3 Not classifiable as to its 
carcinogenicity to 
humans 
505 
4 Probably not 
carcinogenic to humans 
1 
 
In May 2011, the WHO and the IARC released a report classifying 
RF emissions as possibly carcinogenic to humans within Group 2B.59  
The finding was based on a confirmed increased risk for neuroma, a form 
of tumor that develops in human tissue, and glioma, a malignant type of 
brain cancer associated with use of cellular devices.60 
The implications of this determination are unclear but potentially 
sweeping.  France, the country in which the IARC is headquartered, had 
previously imposed a ban on traditional cell phones in primary schools as 
a protective measure against mounting evidence suggesting that RF 
                                                                                                             
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 2–3. 
 58 IARC, Agents Classified, supra note 53. 
 59 WHO Press Release, supra note 17. 
 60 See, e.g. IARC, Agents Classified, supra note 53; Kurt Straif, Non-ionizing 
Radiation, Part II, Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, IARC Monographs, Vol. 102, 
http://www.collegiumramazzini.org/download/STRAIF11.pdf. 
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emissions are particularly harmful to children.61  The ban requires 
manufacturers to produce “stripped down” handsets that only have text 
and no voice capabilities, in an effort to protect children, whose less 
developed skulls permit greater penetration of RF radiation.62  But this 
classification by the WHO is just the latest in a decades-long effort to 
study the health effects of RF emissions. 
A. History of Medical and Scientific Research on RF Emissions from 
Cell Phones, Cell Sites and Other Facilities 
Since the early 1960s, researchers have published hundreds of peer 
reviewed studies that, individually and collectively, raise serious and 
credible questions regarding RF radiation from cell phones and the 
potential health threat it poses to cell phone users.63  These concerns are 
particularly heightened when considering the deleterious effect of RF 
radiation upon the ever-increasing numbers of children who will use the 
devices over a more protracted period of time throughout their lifetime.64  
Despite the increasing frequency of studies suggesting a link between RF 
emission and numerous health hazards, the only consensus reached 
                                                                                                             
 61 Au Revoir. Cell Phones Banned from French Elementary Schools, WKYC 
CHANNEL 3, May 27, 2009, http://www.wkyc.com/news/article/114546/0/Au-Revoir—
Cell-phones-banned-from-French-elementary-schools. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Goforth, supra note 25, at 337 ((citing Symposium, Biologic Effects and 
Health Hazards of Microwave Radiation, Proceedings of an International Symposium, 
Warsaw, October 15–18, 1973, VII (1974), available at http://www.ncbi
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1775882/pdf/amjph00794-0077c.pdf [hereinafter Warsaw 
Symposium]) (noting that studies presented at the international symposium convened in 
1973 in Warsaw and tasked with examining the health effects of exposure to microwave 
radiation “indicated substantial reason to be concerned about the health impact” and 
emphasized the need for further research on RF emissions’ biological effects). 
 64 See, e.g., id. at 348 (citing A.A. Kolodynski & V.V. Kodynska, Motor and 
Psychological Functions of School Children Living in the Area of Skrunda Radio 
Location Station in Latvia, 180 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 87, 87 (1996)) (describing how in 1996 
Latvian researchers studying the effects of exposure to a radar station operating at 
frequencies of 154 to 162 MHz on children found “children living in front of the [station] 
to have less developed memory and attention, slower reaction times and decreased 
endurance of neuromuscular apparatus” than those not living near the facility); cf. id. 
(citing Ezra Berman et al., Observations of Mouse Fetuses After Irradiation with 2.45 
GHz Microwaves, 35 HEALTH PHYSICS 791, 791 (1978)) (highlighting several studies in 
1978 reporting fetal anomalies associated with RF exposure at half that of the legal 
standard); Makker, supra note 25, at 151 (citing R.P. Blackwell, Standards for 
Microwave Radiation, 282 NATURE 360 (1979)) (noting a 1979 study indicating that 
electromagnetic waves can affect fertility through thermal “microwave” effects). 
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within the scientific community is that there is not yet any conclusive 
answer.65 
In 2008, the National Academies of Science recognized the 
inconclusiveness of the existing research and suggested that further 
studies focus on such areas as the biophysical and biochemical or 
molecular mechanisms of RF radiation.66  The next year, Korean 
researchers who compiled and reviewed 465 articles examining a 
potential connection between cell phone use and cancer found possible 
evidence of such risk in the medical literature.67  In the interim, on July 
21, 2008, Ronald B. Herberman, M.D., Director of the University of 
Pittsburgh Cancer Institute (“UPCI”), issued a warning to all physicians, 
researchers and staff at the cancer centers there to decrease their use of 
cell phones due to a possible connection between RF radiation and brain 
tumors.68  Later that summer, Dr. Herberman presented testimony before 
a Congressional Subcommittee on “Tumors and Cell Phone Use: What 
the Science Says,”69 explaining the reasoning behind the issuance of his 
advisory to his colleagues at UPCI, and noting that his” review of the 
literature suggest that most studies claiming that there is no link between 
cell phones and brain tumors are outdated, had methodological concerns, 
and did not include sufficient numbers of long-term cell phone users to 
find an effect . . . .”70 Dr. Herberman advocated severe restrictions on 
cell phone use by children,71 and warned against the lessons of tobacco 
                                                                                                             
 65 Compare Goforth, supra note 25, at 352 (citing Warsaw Symposium) (describing 
how studies presented in Warsaw found changes in the functions of the nervous and 
cardiovascular systems connected to prolonged, low intensity exposure to microwaves), 
with Int’l Comm’n on Non-Ionizing Radiation Prot., Health Issues Related to the Use of 
Hand-Held Radiotelephones and Base Transmitters, 70 HEALTH PHYSICS 587, 589 
(1996), available at http://www.icnirp.de/documents/radiotelephones.pdf [hereinafter 
ICNIRP] (citing Philip E. Hamrick et al., Thermal Denaturation of DNA Exposed to 2450 
MHz CW Microwave Radiation, 56 RADIATION RESEARCH 400 (1973)) (finding no such 
DNA damage as a result of exposure to RF radiation); compare Makker, supra note 25, at 
149 (citing Kari Tahvanainen et al., Cellular Phone Use does not Acutely Affect Blood 
Pressure or Heart Rate of Humans, 25 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 73 (2004)) (noting 2004 
study reporting no significant change in blood pressure or heart rate due to cell phone 
exposure), with EMR Policy Inst. Comment, at 41, A National Broadband Policy for Our 
Future, GN Docket No. 09-51, FCC Rcd. (June 2009), available at http://
www.emrpolicy.org/news/headlines/emrpi_comment_gn_09_51_fcc_09_31.pdf. 
[hereinafter EMR Policy Inst.] (finding heightened risk of developing malignant tumors 
in people exposed to RF radiation from mobile phone transmitter antennas). 
 66 EMR Policy Inst., supra note 65, at 29. 
 67 Myung et al., supra note 5, at 5565. 
 68 See Herberman, supra note 16, at App. A. 
 69 Id. at 9. 
 70 Id. at 5–6. 
 71 Id. at 7 
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and lung cancer, where “debates over whether there was a true increase 
in lung cancer associated with smoking raged far longer than they should 
have, fomented by an active disinformation campaign which delayed for 
decades exposure of that causal link.72 
In 2010, the International Journal of Epidemiology published the 
highly anticipated and widely reported “Interphone Study,” the largest 
study to date on the possible link between mobile phone use and brain 
tumors, conducted in 13 countries over a 10-year-period.73  The study 
found no statistically significant increase in brain tumor risks associated 
with normal use of mobile phones, but found “suggestions of an 
increased risk of developing glioma—generally a malignant tumor 
type—on the side of the head where the cell phone is held” from more 
extensive exposure.74  As for the possible adverse health effects of long 
term heavy use of cell phones, the researchers concluded that any such 
connection requires further investigation.75 Critics of the study 
immediately attacked its conclusions, alleging design flaws and 
protocols, while also noting that the latency period for manifestation of 
cancers might be decades long and could not be captured in any human 
study.76  Even before it was published, a collaborative group of scientists 
and medical researchers from more than a dozen countries issued a 
preemptive attack on the report.  Specifically, the critics challenged the 
methodologies employed by the study’s researchers, noting that the study 
took four years to draft amid “internal squabbling” among its researchers 
about its own conclusions.  Similarly problematic were the Interphone 
Study’s exclusion of children and young adults from the research pool, in 
addition to cancer victims who had died or were too ill to respond to 
researcher’s questions.  Finally the critics charged that the study was 
flawed due to its partial funding by the wireless industry as well as the 
fact the there was a decrease in brain tumors among normal cell phone 
users compared to study participants who used corded phones—a finding 
that even the study’s own researchers declared not statistically 
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“plausible.”77  The Interphone Study Group itself recognized the study’s 
methodological limitations, noting that bias and errors prevented any 
firm conclusion with regards to causation.78  Nevertheless, the FDA 
swiftly issued a “Consumer Update” to the public reporting on the results 
of the Interphone Study under the headline “No Evidence Linking Cell 
Phone Use to Risk of Brian Tumors.”79  For its part, the wireless industry 
immediately cited the study as exonerating cell phones from any risk of 
malignant brain tumors80 and included links to the FDA Consumer 
Update in package inserts for their phones.81 
In 2011, researchers monitored the brain activity of 47 men and 
women during cell phone conversations, where cell phones were placed 
on both their left and right ears.82 While the researchers did not find 
altered activity throughout the entire brain, scans showed “significant 
changes in the orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole, nearest to the ear, 
and the cell phone’s antennae, which are responsible for decision-making 
and auditory processing.”83 However, the study concluded that “[t]his 
finding is of unknown clinical significance.”84 Another 2011 study, 
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conducted in Sweden, found an increase in gliomas as the latency period 
and degree of cell phone usage increased.85 
B. Unique Concerns About RF Exposure Among Children 
As noted above, there is particular concern about RF exposure 
among children and teens, the fastest growing group of cell users in the 
country.86 This growth is actively cultivated by the cell phone industry 
through advertising campaigns which extoll the indispensability of these 
mobile devices to their active life styles, and appealing to parents’ desire 
to remain “in touch” with their children, particularly given the burdens of 
their own demanding schedules.87  However, within the scientific 
community there is a growing concern that, children are most at risk to 
the potentially serious adverse health effects from the use of cell phones. 
The current SAR standard for RF exposure from wireless devices is 
based on exposure testing of an adult male head, and only for thermal 
effects at that.  No consideration is given to the smaller heads of either 
females or children.88  This standard is flawed for several important 
reasons.  First, the still developing nervous system and associated brain-
wave activity in a child are more vulnerable to disturbances by RF 
radiation than are the brain waves of a mature adult.89 Additionally, the 
increased mitotic activity in the cells of developing children makes them 
more susceptible to genetic damage from RF radiation.90  Finally, a 
child’s immune system’s efficiency is also reduced by RF radiation.91  
Children’s immune systems are generally less strong than those of 
adults.92  Consequently, children will be less able to fend off any adverse 
health effects provoked by chronic exposure to RF radiation.93 
Underscoring the need for a new standard accommodating the 
unique risks posed to children is the fact that long before WHO listed 
cell phone emissions as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” in May 2011, 
several governments had already imposed severe restrictions on cell 
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phone use by children.94  Those restrictions are based on the fact that 
children: (1) have developing nervous systems which are likely to be 
more vulnerable to potentially hazardous agents than those of mature 
adults; (2) have smaller heads, thinner skulls, and higher tissue 
conductivity which may mean that children can absorb more energy from 
a particular phone than do adults; and (3) will inevitably use cell phones 
for a longer period of their lives and therefore will tend to accumulate 
greater risk to any detrimental health effects.95  Similarly, researchers at 
the WHO stated in an article in the Journal of Pediatrics in August 2005 
that, until more is known, pediatricians “could advise parents that their 
children’s RF exposure can be reduced by restricting the length of calls 
or by using hands-free devices to keep mobile phones away from the 
head and body.”96 
Numerous foreign governments and governmental agencies have 
taken decisive steps to curb cell phone use by children, including: United 
Kingdom;97 Germany,98 Denmark,99 Thailand,100 France,101 Russia,102 
Italy, 103 Canada,104 and Bangladesh.105  In a statement on January 11, 
2005, Sir William Stewart of the National Radiological Protection Board 
in the United Kingdom urged parents not to give cell phones to children 
under eight years old, and urged that those between eight and fourteen 
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should use them only when absolutely necessary.106  Professor Stewart 
further stated that there was enough uncertainty about possible health 
risks from mobile phones to adopt a cautionary approach, particularly 
with children, and that new research being carried out across Europe led 
him to become “more concerned” about health risks than five years 
earlier.107  Finally, Stewart called for more stringent disclosure 
requirements regarding how much radiation is absorbed in the body from 
different mobile phones.108 
Closer to home, Nicholas Johnson, a former member of the FCC, 
signed a petition and sent a letter to members of Congress in 2005 asking 
them to investigate the marketing of cell phones to children by the 
wireless industry.109  Five years earlier, on April 27, 2000, Norbert 
Hankin, an environmental scientist at the EPA’s Office of Radiation and 
Indoor Air, wrote in an e-mail to Dr. George Carlo, who had conducted a 
study of cell phone safety for the wireless industry: 
Recent studies involving short-term exposures have demonstrated 
that the subtle effects on brain functions can be produced by low-
intensity pulse modulated [RF] radiation.  Some research 
involving rodents has shown adverse effects on short-term and 
long-term memory.  The concern is that if such effects may occur 
in young children, then even slight impairment of learning ability 
over years of education may negatively affect the quality of life 
that could be achieved by these individuals, when adults.  The 
potential effect on learning of exposure from telecommunication 
devices used by children should be considered for study by the 
Radiation Protection Project.110 
Studies have shown that a call of just two minutes can continue to 
affect the electrical activity in a child’s brain for up to an hour after 
use.111  The same study showed that a child’s use of a cell phone results 
in radiation penetrating deeply into a child’s brain.112  Disturbed brain 
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activity can lead to psychiatric or behavioral problems and may also 
cause learning difficulties in children.113 
Another study showed that RF emissions could cause memory loss 
and epilepsy in young users.114  The study found that non-thermal 
radiation from the emissions changed the structure of human cells and 
that children were particularly vulnerable because their skulls were 
smaller and thinner, making it easier for radiation to penetrate.115  More 
recently, researchers at the Yale School of Medicine found that pregnant 
mice exposed to radiation from a cell phone affected brain development 
of the offspring, leading to hyperactivity, impaired memory and other 
behavioral problems after birth.116  The researchers’ goal was to 
determine whether there was a possible correlation between cell phone 
use and the growth in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) 
in children by examining whether mice exposed to RF radiation in utero 
exhibited similar behavior characteristics of children with ADHD.117  
The researchers performed behavioral and electrophysiological studies 
and conducted a battery of tests that identify impairments in memory, 
hyperactivity, anxiety, and fear—conditions often associated with 
ADHD—and found such a relationship.118  The researchers warned, 
however, that “[further experiments are needed in humans and non-
human primates to determine the risk of [RF] exposure during 
pregnancy.”119 
 
IV. THE WIRELESS INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE 
Responding to growing concerns about the safety of their devices, 
some members of the wireless industry began to insert a copy of or link 
to the FDA’s October 1999 “Consumer Update on Mobile Phones”  
(“FDA Update”) into their product packaging.120  The FDA Update 
began by informing consumers: 
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Mobile phones emit low levels of radio frequency energy (i.e., 
radio frequency radiation) in the microwave range while being 
used.  They also emit very low levels of [RF] energy, considered 
non-significant, when in the stand-by mode.  It is well known 
that high levels of RF can produce biological damage through 
heating effects (this is how your microwave oven is able to cook 
food). 
However, it is not known whether, to what extent, or through 
what mechanism, lower levels of RF might cause adverse health 
effects as well.  Although some research has been done to 
address these questions, no clear picture of the biological effects 
of this type of radiation has emerged to date.  Thus, the available 
science does not allow us to conclude that mobile phones are 
absolutely safe, or that they are unsafe.121 
Relying on the conflicting results of the numerous studies investigating 
the potential health hazards from cell-phone usage, the FDA Update 
went on to state, “there is not enough evidence to know for sure, either 
way.”122 
While acknowledging its refusal to take concrete action in 
regulating RF radiation from mobile devices, the FDA sought to assuage 
consumers by emphasizing that it “has urged the mobile phone industry 
to take a number of steps to ensure public safety.”123  These steps 
included recommendations that the mobile industry: 
- support needed research into possible biological effects of RF 
of the type emitted by mobile phones; 
- design mobile phones in a way that minimizes any RF exposure 
to the user that is not necessary for device function; and 
- cooperate in providing mobile phone users with the best 
possible information on what is known about possible effects of 
mobile phone use on human health.124 
In addition to furnishing this FDA Update as a package insert or website 
reference, some members of the wireless industry also began including 
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headsets as part of the package of newly purchased mobile phones, and 
headsets had been marketed as a separate accessory for years. 
In a similar vein, during a widely publicized press conference on 
January 25, 1993, Motorola, a major cellular manufacturer, proclaimed 
that “thousands of studies” had shown that cellular phones were 
“safe.”125  On July 16, 1993, in furtherance of its campaign to assure the 
consumers of the “safety” of cell phones, the industry’s trade association, 
the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (“CTIA”), held a 
press conference to release a report entitled “Safety Update-Fast Facts: 
Portable Cell Phone Safety”126 The report stated unequivocally, in bold 
print; “Rest assured. Cellular telephones are safe!”127  The report further 
stated that the emissions from cell phones fell within the safety standards 
of the FCC.128 
These widely disseminated industry pronouncements prompted the 
Deputy Director for Science at the Center for Devices and Radiological 
Health of the FDA to send a letter to the CTIA three days later. The letter 
directly challenged the statements made by the industry regarding the 
“safety” of cell phones.129  The FDA’s letter to CTIA stated, in pertinent 
part: 
I am writing to let you know that we were concerned about two 
important aspects of your press conference on July 16 concerning 
the safety of cellular phones, and to ask that you carefully 
consider the following comments when you make future 
statements to the press. 
First, both the written press statements and your verbal comments 
during the conference seemed to display an unwarranted 
confidence that these products will be found to be absolutely 
safe. In fact, the unremittingly upbeat tone of the press packet 
strongly implies that there can be no hazard, leading the reader to 
wonder why any further research would be needed at all. (Some 
readers might also wonder how impartial the research can be 
when its stated goal is “a determination to reassure consumers,” 
and when the research sponsors predict in advance that “we 
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expect the new research to reach the same conclusion, that the 
cellular phones are safe.”).130 
The letter went on to declare: 
We are even more concerned that your press statements did not 
accurately characterize the relationship between CTIA and the 
FDA . . . since it is not yet clear whether we will help to direct 
the research program, it is premature to state that we will 
credential the research. 
To sum up . . . our role as a public health agency is to protect 
health and safety, not to “reassure consumers.” I think it is very 
important that the public understand where we stand in 
evaluating the possibility that cellular phones might pose a health 
risk . . . .131 
On January 29, 1993, CTIA announced that cellular 
communications industry . . . will fund research to re-validate the 
findings of the existing studies, which have found that the radio waves 
from cellular phones are safe.”132  CTIA, with input and assistance from 
the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”), hired Dr. George 
Carlo (“Carlo”), an epidemiologist, to chair what was dubbed the 
Surveillance Program to conduct the research through an entity called 
Wireless Technology Research (“WTR”),133  However, CTIA and TIA 
let funding to WTR lapse, thereby terminating the project without any 
conclusions about any potential health risks from cell phone emissions.134 
Later that same year, the cell phone industry, again through its trade 
association CTIA, organized a committee to prepare a manual for public 
dissemination discussing “responsible” cell phone use.135  The draft 
manual included language that acknowledged, or at least implied, that the 
use of cell phones could pose health risks.136 The committee thereafter 
deleted the offending material, set forth in brackets below: 
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“Do not operate your transportable cellular telephone when holding 
the antenna, or when any person is within 4 inches (10 centimeters) of 
the antenna.  [Otherwise you may impair call quality, may cause your 
phone to operate at a higher power level than is necessary, and may 
expose that person to RF energy in excess of the levels established by the 
updated ANSI Standard. 
If you want to limit RF exposure even further, you may choose to 
control the duration of your calls or maintain a distances from the 
antenna of more than 4 inches (10 centimeters)]. 
For best call quality, keep the antenna free from obstructions and 
point it straight up.”137 
CTIA and the TIA elected not to make the disclosures and warnings 
proposed by their own committee.138 
While consistent and adamant about the “safety” of cells phones, 
members of the wireless industry obtained patents in 1998 on radiation 
shielding devices for mobile phones, citing increased concerns about 
exposure of the brain and other organs to emissions that “in the worst 
case it has been suggested could [lead] to a development of malignant 
tumor e.g. glioma from supportive cells.”139  Separately, independent 
companies have capitalized on fears about the potentially   harmful 
health effects of RF radiation from cell phones, marketing aftermarket 
“shields” which are advertised to block any harmful emissions.140 
Meanwhile, the FDA has been anything but consistent in its 
statements–both internally and to the public at large—about the possible 
health risks of RF emissions from cell phones.  In the Spring of 1993, at 
the height of public concern over a possible link between cell phones use 
and brain cancer, biologists at the FDA concluded in an internal 
memorandum that the available data “strongly suggests” that microwave 
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emissions, apart from their thermal heating effects, can “accelerate the 
development of cancer.”141  According to researchers at the FDA’s 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health: “[o]f approximately eight 
chronic animal experiments known to us, five resulted in increased 
numbers of malignancies, accelerated progression of tumors, or both.”142  
But the FDA’s public statements from 1993 through the remainder of the 
decade were consistent with its 1999 Update, and professed an inability 
to reach any firm conclusions about potential adverse health effects of 
RF radiation at levels emitted by cell phones given the inconclusive and 
often conflicting medical research and studies on the subject.143 
Currently, the FDA and FCC websites are even more bullish about 
the safety of cell phones.  While also acknowledging that the “research is 
ongoing” and that “additional research is warranted to address gaps in 
knowledge, such as the effects of cell phone use over the long-term and 
on pediatric populations,” the FDA’s website tells the public that the 
“weight of scientific evidence does not show any association between 
exposure to radiofrequency from cell phones and adverse health 
outcomes.”144  The website downplays the WHO’s May 11, 2011 
classification of RF radiation as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” by 
noting that both coffee and “talc-based body powder” fall into that same 
classification Group 2B.145  As noted previously, the FDA also 
misleadingly promotes the Interphone Study in a Consumer Update 
under the headline “No Evidence Linking Cell Phone Use to Risk of 
Brain Tumors” when the study itself explicitly disavows any such 
sweeping conclusion146 and, to the contrary, expressly acknowledges a 
potentially higher risk of malignant brain cancer from heavy cell phone 
use.147  The FDA also weighs in on children, stating unequivocally that 
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“[t]he scientific evidence does not show a danger to any users of cell 
phones from RF exposure, including children and teenagers,” dismissing 
the December 2005 Stewart Report as “strictly precautionary” and “not 
based on scientific evidence that any health hazard exists.”148  Such a 
ringing endorsement of the purported safety of mobile phone usage 
seems, at best, inconsistent with the FDA’s prior disavowal of any pre-
sale or even primary regulatory authority.149 
For its part, the FCC’s website is equally dismissive, stating flat out 
that any cell phone that meets its SAR level of 1.6 W/kg is “safe,”150 and 
repeating its prior statement that “[t]here is no scientific evidence that 
proves that wireless telephone usage can lead to cancer or other 
problems, including headaches, dizziness or memory loss.”151  However, 
the FCC similarly states that the federal government is monitoring the 
results of new studies “investigating claims of possible health effects 
related to the use of wireless telephones,” and notes that “the FDA is 
participating in an industry-funded research project to further investigate 
possible biological effects.”152  For additional information, the FCC 
directs readers to, among other sources, the industry trade association’s 
own website.153  As before, cell phone manufacturers include links to the 
FCC and FDA websites—and sometimes quote verbatim these official 
statements—on their package inserts.154 
Despite the FDA and FCC’s tepid action regarding the potential 
health hazards of cell phone use, not all governmental watchdogs have 
been so bashful about raising public awareness on the issue.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), an agency familiar with the 
unsettled issues surrounding RF emissions and the guidelines adopted by 
the FCC, acknowledged publicly that “[f]ederal health and safety 
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 154 See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 12, at 5, 26–30; VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note 
81.  The GAO is particularly critical of the manufacturers’ use of these federal agency 
statements, noting that the Consumer Update and other comments by the FDA are “not 
designed for mass distribution as an insert in mobile phone packaging.” GAO Report, 
supra note 12, at 27. 
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guidelines have not yet developed policies concerning possible risk from 
long-term, non-thermal exposures.”155  The agency also stated that “[t]he 
FCC’s exposure guideline is considered protective of effects arising from 
a thermal mechanism but not from all possible mechanisms,”  
emphasizing that “the generalization by many that the guidelines protect 
human beings from harm by any or all mechanisms is not justified.”156  
Confirming that “[m]ost people’s greatest exposures result from the use 
of personal communications devices that expose the head,” the EPA 
concluded that “the current exposure guidelines used by the FCC are 
based on the effects resulting from whole-body heating, not exposure of 
and effect on critical organs including the brain and the eyes.”157 
 
V. THE FCC FORMALLY WEIGHS IN 
In 1985, the FCC for the first time issued guidelines regarding 
human exposure to RF radiation from certain FCC-regulated facilities.158  
Significantly, the FCC action was taken under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),159 rather than any grant of 
authority by Congress to the FCC based on that agency’s expertise or 
field of specialty.160 Under NEPA, all federal agencies, including the 
FCC, are required to assess the environmental impact of any proposed 
“major” actions that might have a “significant” effect on the human 
environment.161 
                                                                                                             
 155 Letter from Norbert Hankin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to Janet 
Newton President, The EMR Network (July 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.emrpolicy.org/litigation/case_law/docs/noi_epa_response.pdf 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id.; see also GAO Report, supra note 12, at 20–21. 
 158 See Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n to Consider Biological Effects 
of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of Radiofrequency Devices. 
Potential Effects of A Reduction in the Allowable Level of Radiofrequency Radiation on 
FCC Authorized Commc’ns Servs. & Equip., 100 F.C.C.2d 543 (1985) (report and order) 
[hereinafter Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order].  The 
FCC has regulatory jurisdiction over wireless telephone service as part of its authority 
over radio transmissions. The FCC regulates the spectrum available for cell phone use 
and sets technical standards associated with cell phone communication. Because cell 
phones transmit radio signals, FCC authorization is required before a particular cell-
phone model may be sold or used in the United States.  47 C.F.R. § 2.803 (2013). 
 159 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2013). 
 160 See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100 
F.C.C.2d at 543–44, 546. 
 161 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii).  NEPA requires all agencies to consider the environ-
mental impact of their proposed actions and to take procedural steps, including 
preparation of environmental assessments (“EAs”) or environmental impact statements 
(“EISs”), before taking any “major” action that may “significantly affect[] the quality of 
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In its 1982 notice of proposed rulemaking, the FCC specifically 
acknowledged that it lacked primary jurisdiction to promulgate health 
and safety standards for RF radiation.162 Nevertheless, the FCC explained 
that NEPA required it to consider whether the activities at facilities and 
physical plants that it licenses significantly affected the environment.163  
For this reason, the FCC proposed amending its rules to address RF 
radiation at certain facilities.164  The FCC did not seek to impose any 
substantive requirements on its regulated industries, nor could it have 
done so under the purely procedural parameters of NEPA.165  The FCC 
also noted that state and local authorities already had adopted regulations 
regarding human exposure to RF radiation, but did not indicate any 
concern about possible conflict between those regulations and the FCC 
standards for transmission facilities.166 
In 1985, the FCC finalized its proposal by amending the 
regulations.  The amendments specified certain actions that would be 
categorically excluded from NEPA’s environmental analysis requirement 
because they lack significant effect.167  The FCC stated that applications 
for certain permits would trigger NEPA requirements if the facilities 
seeking the permits are not in compliance with the otherwise voluntary, 
                                                                                                             
the human environment.”  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).  NEPA does not confer special 
authority on the FCC or on any other federal agency.  NEPA merely imposes obligations 
on all federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of their proposed “major” 
actions.   42 U.S.C. § 4332(2).  NEPA imposes only procedural obligations.  Dept. of 
Trans. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004). “NEPA itself does not mandate 
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.” Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989).  In Robertson the Court mandated 
that “[b]ecause NEPA imposes no substantive requirement that mitigation measures 
actually be taken, it should not be read to require agencies to obtain an assurance that 
third parties will implement particular measures.”  Id. at 353 n.16. 
 162 Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n to Consider Biological Effects of 
Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of Radiofrequency Devices. 
Potential Effects of A Reduction in the Allowable Level of Radiofrequency Radiation on 
FCC Authorized Commc’ns Servs. & Equip., 89 F.C.C.2d 214, 251 (1982) (notice of 
proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation 
Notice]. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 253. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100 
F.C.C.2d 543 (1985). Established by NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) coordinates federal environmental efforts and has issued NEPA regulations “to 
tell federal agencies what they must do to comply with the procedures and achieve the 
goals of the Act.”  40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2013).  CEQ has instructed agencies that they 
may identify categories of actions that are excluded from NEPA because such actions 
typically would not trigger an EA or EIS requirement.  Id. §§ 1507.3(b), 1508.4. 
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privately promulgated health and safety guidelines for RF radiation 
established by the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) in 
1982.168  As in its 1982 proposal, the FCC again explicitly acknowledged 
that it had “neither the expertise nor the authority to develop its own 
health and safety standards.”169  The FCC’s 1985 standard was also 
severely limited in scope.  Many low-power devices, including cell 
phones, were categorically excluded from the NEPA-based guidelines.170  
The FCC regulations implementing NEPA applied only to radio and 
television broadcast stations, earth stations and other “brick and mortar” 
facilities.171  All other FCC-licensed facilities and systems, including 
“cellular” facilities, were categorically excluded from FCC regulation of 
exposure to RF radiation.172 
In 1992, ANSI adopted new guidelines for permissible RF radiation 
exposure that applied to additional categories, including cell phones.173  
The FCC then proposed updating its NEPA regulations to reflect ANSI’s 
new findings.174  Because the 1992 ANSI guidelines addressed cell 
phones, the FCC’s proposal suggested incorporating cell phones within 
its regulatory prerogative.175 
While the FCC rulemaking was underway, Congress enacted the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”),176 which amended the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“FCA”). The TCA did not 
authorize the FCC to issue substantive health or safety regulations 
addressing RF emissions, but nevertheless directed the FCC to complete 
the NEPA rulemaking within 180 days.177  Section 704(a) gave 
preemptive effect to the RF emission regulations that the FCC was 
directed to prescribe under Section 704(b), but only to the extent 
explicitly stated in 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) governing wireless 
                                                                                                             
 168 Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 
543–44. 
 169 Id. at 560. 
 170 Id. at 563. 
 171 Id. at 561–63, 567. 
 172 Id. at 559, 563; see Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n to Consider 
Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of 
Radiofrequency Devices. Potential Effects of A Reduction in the Allowable Level of 
Radiofrequency Radiation on FCC Authorized Commc’ns Servs. & Equip., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 
2064, 2065–66 (1987) (second report and order). 
 173 See Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental “Effects” of Radiofrequency 
Radiation, 8 F.C.C. Rcd. 2849, 2850 (1993) (notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 174 Id. at 2851. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 177 Id. § 704(b). 
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service “facilities.”178 Prior to the passage of the TCA, many state and 
local authorities had adopted ordinances that restricted the number and 
location of wireless stations and transmission lines due to concerns over 
RF radiation emissions. The FCC was powerless to interfere with this 
local action, and nothing in either NEPA itself or the FCC’s NEPA-based 
RF radiation regulations gave the agency any preemptive authority over 
those facilities and transmission lines.  The TCA changed that and gave 
the FCC the specific authority it needed to preempt state and local law 
that conflicted with its own RF radiation regulations governing the size 
and location of those facilities.179  But the FCA contained two additional 
provisions that severely restricted the extent to which Congress allowed 
FCC regulation of RF radiation to be given preemptive effect.  Even 
before the TCA, the FCA contained a “savings” provision that remained 
in effect and states: “Nothing in this chapter [] shall in any way abridge 
or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the 
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”180 The third 
explicit TCA mandate unambiguously rejected any “implied preemption” 
of state or local law. More particularly, Section 601(c)(1) of the TCA 
expressly states, under the heading “EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS”: 
(c) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW— 
(1)No Implied Effect—This Act and the amendments 
made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, 
impair or supercede Federal, State or local law unless 
expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.181 
The plain meaning of this statutory language requires no interpretation., 
although any doubt as to Congress’s intent is easily eliminated by 
consulting the legislative history of Section 601(c)(1): “The conference 
agreement adopts the House provision stating that the bill does not have 
any effect on any Federal, State or local law unless the bill expressly so 
provides. This provision prevents affected parties from asserting that the 
bill impliedly preempts other laws.”182 If “conflict” preemption bars 
                                                                                                             
 178 Id. § 704(a). 
 179 See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 12 
F.C.C. Rcd. 13,494, 13,542 (1997) (notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 180 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1934). 
 181 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006); 
see also 47 U.S.C. § 414.  In the original statute, “this chapter” was “this Act.” 
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (repealed 
and amended 1996).  The chapter includes all of the FCA and subsequent amendments. 
 182 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
US.C.C.A.N. 10 (emphasis added). Thus, Section 601(c)(1) of the TCA “specifically 
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application of a state law that would “stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of 
Congress,”183 it is difficult to understand the application of that doctrine 
when Congress itself has explicitly stated that particular federal statutes 
should have no such “implied” preemptive effect. 
After passage of the TCA, and in accordance with the TCA’s 
requirement that the FCC conclude its RF rulemaking within 180 days, 
the FCC adopted new standards, which it expressly referred to as 
“guidelines,” addressing RF radiation emitted by its regulated facilities 
and cell phones on August 1, 1996.  Under the new regulations, the FCC 
may approve licensing and authorization applications from facilities that 
emit less than a specified amount of RF radiation without undertaking 
any environmental analysis under NEPA.184  In addition to facilities, the 
1996 regulations, for the first time, also covered “portable devices” such 
as cell phones.185  However, as with its prior promulgations, the 
regulation of portable devices was attributed to the FCC’s 
“responsibilities under [NEPA] to evaluate the environmental 
significance of its actions,” rather than the delegation of any authority 
under the TCA or under any other telecommunications statute.186 The 
FCC also adopted a regulation limiting preemption patterned on Section 
332(c)(7)(B)(iv) and incorporated verbatim its restrictive preemptive 
language.187 
It bears repeating that the FCC issued its 1996 guidelines to satisfy 
its “responsibilities under [NEPA] to evaluate the environmental 
                                                                                                             
provides that the amendments shall not impliedly preempt state or local law.” City of 
Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1999). Accord AT&T Commc’ns of the Pac. 
Nw., Inc. v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029 (Or. 2001). 
There are two types of “implied” preemption: field preemption, and conflict preemption. 
“Field” preemption applies when Congress’s “intent to pre-empt all state law in a 
particular area may be inferred [because] the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive” or “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be 
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”  Colacicco v. 
Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hillsboro County v. Automated 
Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). “Conflict” preemption applies when “‘state 
law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,’ even though 
Congress has not displaced all law in a given area.”  Id.  In most “conflict” preemption 
cases, the relevant inquiry is whether “state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.” 
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 266 (quoting Hillsboro, 471 U.S. at 713). 
 183 See supra note 182. 
 184 See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 11 
F.C.C. Rcd. 15,123, 15,179 (1996) (report and order). 
 185 See id. 
 186 See 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(c) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 187 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1307(e) (2013). 
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significance of its actions.”188  Accordingly, if an application for equip-
ment authorization from a cell phone manufacturer shows that the phones 
emit more than the specified amount of RF radiation, FCC regulations 
require the completion of an environmental analysis, in the form of an 
EIS or similar study, to satisfy NEPA before the application can be 
considered.  
Notably, while the FCC has addressed RF emissions from cell 
phones to meet its obligations under NEPA and the FCA provisions 
expressly disavowing any implied preemptive effect, Congress has 
conferred authority upon another agency to issue preemptive radiation 
standards for consumer products.  Specifically, under the Radiation 
Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, Congress directed the FDA to 
“prescribe performance standards for electronic products to control the 
emission of electronic product radiation from such products if [the FDA] 
determines that such standards are necessary for the protection of the 
public health and safety.”189  If the FDA issues regulations prescribing 
such health and safety standards, those regulations preempt conflicting 
state and local law.190  Indeed, the cell phone industry, seeking to thwart 
a consumer class action in federal court in Louisiana under the doctrine 
of preemption, invoked the FDA’s exclusive authority under the 
Radiation Act as grounds for dismissal, asserting, “[p]reemption exists 
under the ‘complex regulatory scheme’ governing RFR emissions 
created by the Electronic Product Radiation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360hh-
360ss.”191  Even after the adoption of its new RF radiation guidelines, the 
FCC continued to affirmatively disclaim any responsibility for assessing 
the health and safety effects of wireless telephones. For example, in his 
April 12, 2001 letter to the GAO addressing the newly released GAO 
Telecommunications Report, the Managing Director of the FCC 
emphatically reaffirmed that the agency has no regulatory oversight on 
matters pertaining to health and safety involving cell phones or any other 
consumer device, stating, “I reiterate, as the Report notes elsewhere, the 
                                                                                                             
 188 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(a) (addressing RF radiation evaluation for cell phones); see 11 
F.C.C. Rcd. at 15,125 (the guidelines were issued to satisfy NEPA and “the requirements 
of the [TCA] for a timely resolution of this proceeding”). 
 189 21 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1) (2013). 
 190 Id. § 360ss. 
 191 Motorola Inc.’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and supporting 
Memorandum of Law, at 1–2, 5–8, Naquin v. Nokia Mobile Phones, Inc., No. 00-2023, 
2000 WL 33593205 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2000); see also Motorola Inc.’s Supplemental Rule 
12(c) Brief, at 2, 9, Naquin, 2000 WL 33593205. 
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FCC has neither primary jurisdiction nor expertise in health and safety 
matters.”192 
The FCC has itself recognized numerous organizations as having 
primary responsibility for the development of health and safety 
guidelines regarding RF radiation emissions in cell phones, including: 
the FDA, the EPA and even such non-governmental “national and 
international health agencies and organizations” as the WHO.193  The 
FDA and FCC websites also repeatedly advised of ways to mitigate 
exposure to potentially dangerous RF emissions.  For example, the sites 
informed consumers that “[i]f you must conduct extended conversations 
by wireless phone every day, you could place more distance between 
your body and the source of RF [radiation], since exposure level drops 
off dramatically with distance,” while also recommending the use of a 
headset to provide added distance between the phone and the body,194  
This erratic regulatory history set the stage for equally inconsistent 
judicial decisions that followed. 
 
VI. STATE LAW CONSUMER LITIGATION RELATED TO RF EMISSIONS 
Amidst the scientific and medical debate and against this 
inconsistent regulatory backdrop, consumers began filing lawsuits 
against the cell phone industry.  One such case, Farina v. Nokia, Inc,195 
was a class action on behalf of Pennsylvania consumers, alleging claims 
for breach of warranty and other causes of action against manufacturers 
and sellers of cell phones.196  Farina’s claim was simple: the cell phone 
industry had repeatedly, and consistently, promoted their cell phones as 
being totally “safe.”197  Under Pennsylvania state warranty law, the 
burden was on the industry to prove their assurances of “safety,” not on 
Farina to demonstrate any causal connection to cancer or other adverse 
                                                                                                             
 192 GAO Report, supra note 12, at 34.  The FCC went on to note that the FCC’s 
guidelines on RF exposure based on recommendations made by private “standards-setting 
organizations” such ANSI and were adopted following “consultation” with other federal 
health and safety agencies without the formal rulemaking process required of those 
agencies.  Id. 
 193 See Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12, at 16 (“[T]he FCC’s primary jurisdiction 
does not lie in the health and safety area”).  It is of no small interest that the FCC also 
specifically observed that “much of the non-military research on biological effects of RF 
energy in the U.S. is being funded by industry organizations . . . .”  Id. at 9. 
 194 FAQs, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
 195 578 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d sub nom. 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 365 (2011). 
 196 See id. 
 197 Id. at 747. 
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health effects.198 The Complaint sought common law and statutory 
damages as well as injunctive relief, including requiring that corrective 
notices be sent to former purchasers and the public at large warning that 
the manufacturers’ unqualified representations of “safety” were not 
supported by the scientific evidence.199  Farina also sought a requirement 
that a protective headset, which already was being sold by cell phone 
manufacturers as a separate add-on accessory be furnished with each cell 
phone .200 
Shortly after Farina was filed in state court, the case was removed 
to federal court on the basis of “complete preemption” and subsequently 
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland as part of multi-district litigation (“MDL”) proceedings 
there.201   Farina, along with several other MDL plaintiffs, moved for 
remand based on lack of federal jurisdiction.202  The Maryland MDL 
Transferee Court denied that motion and dismissed all of the cases in the 
MDL on the basis of preemption.203  On appeal the Fourth Circuit 
reversed.204 
In finding no preemptive effect, the Fourth Circuit first noted that 
the FCC’s RF radiation standard for cell phones was not promulgated 
pursuant to a substantive mandate found in the TCA but under NEPA.205  
Second, the court considered the TCA’s preemption provision,206 and 
found that the statute’s “specificity” as to the preemptive scope of the 
FCC’s RF radiation standards for wireless service facilities “weighs 
against a finding that Congress has an implicit goal of making 
preemptive the RF radiation standards for all other types of wireless tele-
                                                                                                             
 198 See 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201. 
 199 Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 747. 
 200 Id. at 748.  The FDA and FCC had themselves stated that protective headsets 
would mitigate RF exposure.  See id. 
 201 Id.  The “complete preemption” doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule. Under the doctrine, “when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law 
cause of action through complete pre-emption,” the state-law claim is removable because 
“[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim 
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law, is in reality based on federal law.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 
(2003). 
 202 See Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
 203 See In re Wireless Tel. Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liab. Lit., 216 F. 
Supp. 2d 474 (D. Md. 2002), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 
F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 204 Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 998 (2005). 
 205 Id. at 457. 
 206 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (1996). 
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communications equipment, including wireless telephones.”207  Third, 
looking to the statute’s savings clause208 and the express “No Implied 
Effect” provision,209 the Fourth Circuit recognized that these clauses 
“counsel against any broad construction of the goals of [the relevant 
statutory provisions] that would create an implicit conflict with state tort 
law.”210  For all these reasons, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the state-
law claims did not conflict with the purposes and objectives of Congress 
and the FCC.211 
Having determined that the plaintiffs’ claims posed no conflict with 
Congress’s objectives, the court next considered whether the specific 
relief sought— provision of headsets—would “stand as an obstacle to 
Congress’ actual goal of establishing a nationwide network of wireless 
telephone service coverage.”212  The court determined that it would 
not.213  Therefore, the court held, the motion to remand the removed 
cases should have been granted by the district court because the federal 
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged 
by Farina and the other plaintiffs.214 
The Fourth Circuit in Pinney thus squarely rejected the applicability 
of the preemption doctrine to the cases in the MDL proceeding to which 
Farina was a party.  Because one of the MDL cases, Naquin v. Nokia, 
Inc., was in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the Fourth 
Circuit also considered whether the claims alleged were actually 
preempted on the merits—that is, whether preemption was available as a 
defense, as opposed to a basis for jurisdiction.215  The Fourth Circuit 
similarly rejected the defendants’ express preemption and field 
preemption arguments, holding that the plaintiffs’ nearly identical 
consumer claims in Naquin were not impliedly preempted by the FCA, 
TCA or FCC regulations.216 
Remand to Pennsylvania state court did not, however, end the 
Farina saga.  When Farina amended his Complaint to add an additional 
defendant, that triggered removal under the recently adopted Class 
                                                                                                             
 207 Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458. 
 208 47 U.S.C. § 414. 
 209 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1). 
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Action Fairness Act,217 so Farina once again found himself in federal 
court.218 Because there was no longer any MDL proceeding for these 
cases, Farina’s case remained in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.219 
Back in federal district court, the cell phone defendants filed 
another motion to dismiss.220  They argued, as they had in the MDL 
proceedings, that Farina’s claims were expressly preempted and 
impliedly preempted under both field preemption and conflict 
preemption theories.221  Although it rejected the express preemption and 
field preemption arguments, the district court held that the claims were  
preempted through conflict preemption by the FCC’s RF radiation 
guidelines.222  Relying on the FCC’s obligation under NEPA to deter-
mine the environmental impact of its actions, and despite the fact that the 
FCC’s guidelines do not impose a substantive requirement on 
manufacturers and sellers of cell phones, the court stated that the 
allegations in the complaint “trample upon the FCC’s authority to 
determine the maximum standard for RF emissions.”223  In direct 
contravention to the Fourth Circuit’s holding and analysis in Pinney, the 
district court held that  Farina’s claims “seek to impose legal duties that 
would conflict directly with federal regulatory mandates because the 
Defendants could be held liable even though they indisputably complied 
with the SAR maximum.” “224  
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Farina’s claims were 
neither expressly preempted nor preempted under a field preemption 
theory but that, notwithstanding the FCA’s savings clause and the TCA’s 
explicit prohibition against implied preemption, the case posed an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the agency’s objectives and, therefore, 
was impliedly preempted.225  In effect, the Third Circuit treated the 
FCC’s guidelines arising solely from the exercise of its statutory 
obligations under NEPA as both a floor and a ceiling on the protections 
that may be provided consumers to against RF radiation. 
There is no indication that Congress intended agency environmental 
guidelines implementing NEPA to have the effect of superseding state 
consumer protection laws.  To the contrary, Congress expressly declared 
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that “cooperation with State and local governments” was part of the 
continuing policy of the federal government under NEPA.226  Nor had the 
FCC construed NEPA as statutory authority for preempting state and 
local regulation of the environmental effects of RF radiation. Even 
before it began regulating this area, the FCC itself recognized that state 
and local authorities were already regulating human exposure to RF 
radiation even though NEPA had been in effect for 13 years.227 
Allowing the Farina case to go forward would not have somehow 
upset any delicate federal balance between health concerns and 
promotion of wireless service throughout the country. Stating the 
obvious, the Fourth Circuit observed: “[i]t is difficult to understand how 
a headset requirement . . . would affect the establishment of a nationwide 
wireless service network or the availability of wireless service 
coverage.”228  Indeed, as noted previously, the cell phone industry 
routinely sells headsets as separate accessories for their cell phones, so 
these products are already in the marketplace, do not require any 
retrofitting or redesign of their phones and cannot possibly conflict with 
any pervasive and exclusive regulatory scheme. 
 Equating federal regulation, even substantial regulation, with 
preemption as the Third Circuit did in Farina is misguided.  Many 
industries and products are “regulated” by federal agencies but there is 
no question that even extensive oversight has no inevitable preemptive 
impact on state consumer laws.  The United States Supreme Court 
decision in Altria Group Inc. v. Good229 made this abundantly clear.  
Altria involved allegations of false advertising in the sale of “light” 
cigarettes, much like the warranty and related claims alleged in 
Farina.230  In Altria, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
plaintiffs’ claims, brought under the Maine consumer protection statute, 
were expressly and impliedly preempted by the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act (the “Labeling Act”).231  The Supreme 
Court reaffirmed established principles governing the preemptive 
limitation of federal statutes, first reiterating the long-established 
principle: “[w]hen addressing questions of express or implied pre-
emption, we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States [are] not to be superceded by the Federal Act 
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unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”232  
Continuing, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against 
preemption applies with “particular force when Congress has legislated 
in a field traditionally occupied by the States” such as false and deceptive 
advertising—the same subject areas involved in Farina.233   Despite the 
fact that the declared purpose of the Labeling Act at issue in Altria was 
“to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette 
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between 
smoking and health,”234 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ 
claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment were not 
preempted even by such a broad delegation of federal authority.235  The 
consumer fraud claims in Altria, like the “duty not to deceive” claims 
prevailing in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,236 merely alleged “false or 
misleading statements” which were not premised on federal law and did 
not offend either the Labeling Act or any regulatory authority of the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).237 
The Supreme Court thus found the plaintiffs’ claims were not 
“impliedly preempted” in Altria.238  Despite a long history of industry 
“guidance,” formal litigation, consent orders, official letters and other 
action by the FTC designed specifically to prevent misleading 
advertising relating to “light” cigarettes, the plaintiffs’ consumer fraud 
claims did not conflict with those parallel federal activities in a manner 
which warranted implied conflict preemption.  If anything, the direct 
regulatory oversight in Altria far exceeded the tentative and even 
expressly disavowed the FCC’s authority over health and safety issues 
relating to cell phones, to say nothing of the express provisions against 
preemption in the TCA. 
Concurrent with the Third and Fourth Circuits’ consideration of 
federal preemption of state tort claims brought against cellular 
manufacturers, another piece of litigation was winding its way through 
the courts.  In Murray v. Motorola, Inc.,239 in which the plaintiffs alleged 
consumer class action claims similar to those alleged in Farina and 
Pinney, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached an entirely 
                                                                                                             
 232 Altria, 555 U.S. at 77 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)). 
 233 Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 234 Id. at 78. 
 235 Id. at 91. 
 236 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 237 Altria, 555 U.S. at 80–83. 
 238 See id. at 85–90. 
 239 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009). 
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different conclusion.240  Rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, Murray 
held that “state regulation” that would “alter the balance” that the FCC 
sought to achieve through its RF regulation was preempted.241  It found 
that state law claims based on allegations about the adequacy of the FCC 
guidelines or the safety of FCC-authorized cell phones were therefore 
preempted.242  The D.C. Circuit further found that claims seeking 
damages based on the non-thermal effects of cell-phone radiation were 
also preempted, despite the fact that the FCC guideline does not address 
non-thermal effects at all.243 
Contrary to the Third Circuit’s decision in Farina, however, 
Murray did allow some claims to go forward. The court held that claims 
about false or misleading statements or omissions that do not depend on 
proof that cell phones are unreasonably dangerous are not preempted.244  
For example, Murray permitted a claim based on the allegation that 
defendants falsely represented that “[r]esearch has shown that there is 
absolutely no risk of harm associated with the use of cell phones” to go 
forward.245  Importantly, the surviving claims in Murray directly mirror 
those brought by Farina before the Third Circuit. 
Thus, as the law now stands, the viability of state-law claims 
arising out of the sale of cell phones—and the industry’s representations 
about the safety of those devices—depends entirely on the venue in 
which those suits are brought.  Consumers in Maryland and other states 
in the Fourth Circuit can bring claims that consumers in Pennsylvania 
and other states of the Third Circuit cannot—at least not in their courts.  
Consequently, consumers near the Delaware-Maryland border in 
Newark, Delaware are barred entirely from bringing any consumer 
claims under the TCA in their local state or federal courts, while 
consumers just a few miles away in Elkton, Maryland have the full 
arsenal of state law remedies for breach of warranty and other statutory 
and common law claims.  Further South in Washington, D.C., consumers 
have a mixed bag of rights and remedies.  The inconsistent availability of 
these legal protections depends entirely on where the consumer brings 
his or her case, although the source of those limitations is the same 
                                                                                                             
 240 Id. at 768, 
 241 Id. at 776. 
 242 Id. at 789. 
 243 Id. at 778–79. 
 244 Id. at 783. 
 245 Id.  at 784. (Murray also held that claims based on injuries caused by phones 
acquired prior to August 1996, when the FCC issued the current standard, or phones that 
did not comply with the current standard, were not preempted. Id. at 781–82.). 
2013] A Tale of Two Circuits 37 
 
federal statute interpreted and applied dissimilarly and inconsistently by 
those courts. 
 
VII. THE COURTS’ CONFLICTING DECISIONS EXACERBATE AN 
EXISTING DISPUTE OVER WHETHER FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS 
MAY IMPLIEDLY PREEMPT STATE LAW EVEN WHEN THE AUTHORIZING 
STATUTE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ANY SUCH IMPLIED PREEMPTION 
The FCC derives its authority from Congress, which, through the 
FCA, delegated to the FCC authority to regulate communications by wire 
and radio and, in the TCA, directed the FCC to complete its then-pending 
regulations regarding RF emissions within 180 days.  As noted above, 
Congress also expressly limited the preemptive effect of those 
regulations on state laws concerning the location or construction of brick 
and mortar telecommunications facilities.  Congress further specified that 
the FCA does not “in any way abridge or alter” common-law or statutory 
remedies.246  To remove any further doubt about the limits of authority 
conferred on the FCC, Congress explicitly stated, in a TCA provision 
carefully entitled “No Implied Effect,” that the TCA “shall not be 
construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law 
unless expressly so provided.”247  Although the Supreme Court has held 
that a general savings clause such as Section 414 of the FCA does not bar 
the application of conflict preemption,248 it has never addressed the effect 
of a statutory provision that explicitly disclaims any implied preemptive 
effect. 
These cases raise that important question of whether the objectives 
of an agency regulation may preempt state law where the statute 
authorizing or requiring the agency to act explicitly states that it has no 
implied preemptive effect.  Put simply, may a court find implied 
preemption on the basis of “frustration of purposes” of a regulation 
promulgated pursuant to a statute that Congress has stated does not 
impliedly preempt state law? On this question, the courts are in conflict. 
First, courts have treated the “No Implied Effect” clause of 
Section 601(c)(1)—in strikingly dissimilar ways.  The Fourth Circuit in 
Pinney held that the clause showed that Congress did not intend RF 
radiation standards for cell phones to be preemptive.249  In direct conflict, 
                                                                                                             
 246 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1934). 
 247 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1). 
 248 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). 
 249 See Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458.  Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has held that 
Section 601(c)(1) “precludes a reading that ousts the state [law] by implication.”  AT&T 
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the Third Circuit, while acknowledging that “it is conceivable that 
§ 601(c)(1) could be dispositive,” held that Congress’s express disavowal 
of implied preemption was, in essence, ineffective because “a savings 
provision does not ‘bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption 
principles.’”250  The Third Circuit thus construed the “No Implied Effect” 
provision to mean only that “Congress’s objectives are more limited than 
they might otherwise be characterized.”251  The court did not explain how 
its holding represented merely a “more limited” reading or how its 
reading was consistent with Section 601(c)(1).  Similarly, in a footnote in 
Murray, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals casually dismissed 
Section 601(c)(1) and Pinney’s reliance on it.252 
The question presented by Section 601(c)(1) is likely to recur. On 
February 2, 2011, a currently pending bill introduced in the Oregon 
legislature asked the cell phone industry to place disclosure notices 
stating that the safety of the devices has not been established in cell 
phone packaging.253  San Francisco has adopted an ordinance requiring 
disclosure of the amount of RF radiation emitted by cell phones, which is 
currently being challenged in federal district court in part on the theory 
that the ordinance is preempted.254 
More broadly, on the question of whether Congress may statutorily 
grant authority to regulate while withholding implied authority to 
preempt, the Third Circuit’s decision conflicts in principle with decisions 
construing the Nutrition Labeling in Education Act (“NLEA”), which 
similarly disclaims implied preemptive effect.255  In conflict with the 
                                                                                                             
Commc’ns of Ill. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 349 F.3d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
challenges to Illinois statute mandating methodology for determining rate that local 
telephone company could charge to use its network). 
 250 Farina, 625 F.3d at 131. 
 251 Id. at 132. 
 252 Murray, 982 A.2d at 778 n.19. 
 253 The pending bill (designated LC 1273 in the state legislature) would require a 
warning on cell phone packages and the back of the phones stating: 
This is a radio-frequency (RF), radiation emitting device that has nonthermal biological 
effects for which no safety guidelines have yet been established. Controversy exists as to 
whether these effects are harmful to humans. Exposure to RF radiation may be reduced 
by limiting your use of this device and keeping away from the head and body.  See 
Cecilia Kang, Oregon considers cell phone radiation label, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/02/oregon_state_senator_chip_shie.
html. 
 254 See CTIA - Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 685 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012). 
 255 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(1), 
104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (NLEA “shall not be construed to preempt any provision of State 
law, unless such provision is expressly preempted”). 
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Third Circuit, courts have held that this provision precludes implied 
preemption.256  Also contrary to the Third Circuit’s treatment of 
Section 601(c)(1), the FDA reads the NLEA provision to “clearly 
manifest[] Congress’s intention” that there be no preemption under the 
NLEA outside the scope of that statute’s express preemption 
provision.257 
Other statutes, too new to have been addressed in litigation, also 
expressly limit or eliminate any implied preemptive effect.258 For 
example, Section 1041(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act states: 
Relation to Other Provisions of Enumerated Consumer Laws 
That Relate to State Law.—No provision of this title, except as 
provided in section 1083, shall be construed as modifying, 
limiting, or superseding the operation of any provision of an 
enumerated consumer law that relates to the application of a law 
in effect in any State with respect to such Federal law.259 
                                                                                                             
 256 Compare Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009), 
Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and 
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007), with Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1, 7-9 (Cal. 
2004) (finding a state law impliedly preempted notwithstanding a savings clause directed 
expressly to that state law). 
 257 State Petitions Requesting Exemption From Federal Preemption, 56 Fed. Reg. 
60,528, 60,530 (Nov. 27, 1991) (codified as 21 C.F.R. pt. 100); see State Petitions 
Requesting Exemption From Federal Preemption, 58 Fed. Reg. 2462 (Jan. 6, 1993) 
(codified as 21 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“[T]he only State requirements that are subject to 
preemption are those that are affirmatively different on matters that are covered by [the 
express preemption provision] of the act.”) (emphasis added). 
 258 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1041, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). “Sec. 1041(a)(2) states: “Rule of 
Construction.—This title, other than sections 1044 through 1048, may not be construed 
as annulling, altering, or affecting, or exempting any person subject to the provisions of 
this title from complying with, the statutes, regulations, orders, or interpretations in effect 
in any State, except to the extent that any such provision of law is inconsistent with the 
provisions of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.” 
 259 Id. at § 1041(b); see also Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
110-314, § 231, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008).  Section 231 states: 
Rule With Regard to Preemption.—The provisions of [statutes implemented 
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission] establishing the extent to 
which those Acts preempt, limit, or otherwise affect any other Federal, 
State, or local law, any rule, procedure, or regulation, or any cause of action 
under State or local law may not be expanded or contracted in scope, or 
limited, modified or extended in application, by any rule or regulation 
thereunder, or by reference in any preamble, statement of policy, executive 
branch statements, or other matter associated with the publication of any 
such rule or regulation. In accordance with the provisions of those Acts, the 
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The Third Circuit’s reasoning calls into doubt the efficacy of and 
deference afforded to these deliberate attempts by Congress to limit the 
preemptive scope of important enactments, and will encourage litigants 
and courts to ascribe implied preemptive effect to regulations promul-
gated under these laws in defiance of Congress’s expressly stated intent. 
This question will only grow in importance in light of Congress’s 
increasing use of no-implied-preemption clauses. To ensure that states do 
not misunderstand the scope of the authority they retain this split requires 
definitive resolution by the Supreme Court. 
Apart from violating Congress’s express declaration that there 
should be “no implied preemption” of state law rights is the disturbing 
deference given to the FCC’s guidelines—admittedly adopted by the 
FCC not under the FCA, TCA or within any sphere of the agency’s 
specific expertise, but NEPA—a general statute applicable to all federal 
agencies. 
The FCC guidelines held to bar Farina’s state law breach of 
warranty claims do not impose a substantive standard on wireless 
phones.  Rather, as the regulation and the regulatory history make clear, 
47 C.F.R.§ 2.1093(c) states the level of RF radiation that a cell phone 
can emit without triggering the FCC’s NEPA obligation to evaluate the 
device’s environmental effect before authorizing the device for sale.  The 
FCC did not issue the standard to impose a substantive obligation on 
companies, but merely acted “[t]o meet its responsibilities under 
NEPA.”260 
Accordingly, if a company applies for authorization to sell a cell 
phone that does not meet the standard, FCC regulations do not require 
the FCC to reject the application or the company to make any change to 
its product.  They require only the preparation of an environmental 
assessment before the application can be granted.261  Similarly, meeting 
the FCC “guidelines” does not mean that the company is in compliance 
with some federal requirement that displaces any others to which it might 
                                                                                                             
Commission may not construe any such Act as preempting any cause of 
action under State or local common law or State statutory law regarding 
damage claims. 
 260 Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 11 
F.C.C. Rcd. at 15,125; see Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and 
Order, 100 F.CC.2d at 561 (“Although the Commission has neither the expertise nor the 
authority to develop its own health and safety standards, we are required by the national 
Environmental policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.  (1976) to consider 
whether Commission actions will significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment.”). 
 261 See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100 
F.C.C.2d at 560. 
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be subject.  It means only that the agency does not have to take the 
procedural steps required by NEPA before it acts.262 
To be sure, cell phone manufacturers have generally chosen to stay 
within the level stated in the guidelines so as to avoid the delay that 
would result if the FCC required the requisite NEPA analysis. 
Nonetheless, the regulation is, by express statement of the FCC, a 
regulation issued to implement NEPA.263 And NEPA is a procedural 
statute that “does not mandate particular results” but rather “imposes 
only procedural requirements on federal agencies.”264 
No court has ever before held that an agency’s decision to 
categorically exclude an action from NEPA’s procedural requirements 
preempts application of state substantive law applicable to private 
conduct.265  And, in contrast to the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in 
Pinney found no preemption in part because the regulations on which the 
preemption theory was based were promulgated pursuant to NEPA, not 
pursuant to any mandate of or delegated authority under the FCA or 
TCA.266 
The Third Circuit’s holding has implications for numerous federal 
regulatory agencies, regulated entities, and the public.  NEPA’s 
requirements apply to every agency and to any action that might have a 
significant environmental effect.267  Under the Third Circuit’s analysis, 
agency regulations identifying regulatory actions that will not trigger 
NEPA requirements could have broad substantive, preemptive effect on 
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state laws regulating the conduct of the private actors whose activities 
would be considered in a NEPA analysis, if one were required.268 
Similarly, under the Third Circuit’s approach, agency decisions that 
an environmental assessment is not required in particular cases because 
of the absence of a significant environmental impact could suddenly 
operate to preempt the application of state environmental, safety, health, 
and consumer protection standards to the underlying private conduct.  
Yet “it is apparent that the express intent of NEPA is not to exclude state 
environmental regulation, but to encourage cooperation with local 
governments to achieve the Congressional goal of environmental protec-
tion.”269  Indeed, NEPA has long co-existed with an array of state 
environmental laws.270 
The potential wide ranging effect of arguments of “NEPA 
preemption” are far-reaching, and have further muddied the waters of the 
already murky preemption pond. When this issue eventually reaches the 
United States Supreme Court, as it almost certainly will, the Court 
should respect the explicit directives of Congress in the TCA, and reject 
the sweeping preemption adopted by the Third Circuit in Farina.   
                                                                                                             
 268 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 372.5(c) (2013); 10 C.F.R. § 1021.410 (2011); 18 C.F.R. 
§ 380.5 (2012); 21 C.F.R. §§ 25.30–25.34,; Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep’t of Interior, 516 
Dep’tal Manual 11, § 11.8(b) (2008). 
 269 Joan Newman, Comment, A Consideration of Federal Preemption in the Context 
of State and Local Environmental Regulation, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 97, 108 
(1990). 
 270 See, e.g., Nicholas Robinson, SEQRA’s Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA’s in 
the Sister States, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 & n. 16–19 (1982) (citing state “mini-
NEPA” laws). 
 
